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CEO Inside Debt and Firm Debt 
Purpose: CEO inside debt and firm debt are examined jointly to further investigate the 
compensation incentives on risky decision-making and the resulting financial policy decisions 
concerning the debt structure of the firm. 
Design: Using S&P 1500 data from CRSP, Compustat, Execucomp, and Capital IQ between 
2006 and 2011, statistical analysis and regression models are used to determine potential 
correlations between the variable of interest, inside debt, and debt control variables, including 
specialization. 
Findings: Firms with high inside debt specialize in commercial loans and drawn credit lines. 
Larger firms diversify their debt holdings among commercial instruments and senior bonds. As 
firm size increases with inside debt, the effects are counteracted. Larger firms with high CEO 
inside debt have lower interest rates on these debt instruments and shorter maturities, suggesting 
a more conservative financing policy concerning debt. 
Research Implications: Debt diversification is partially affected by compensation in the form of 
inside debt. Future studies of debt diversification should include CEO compensation controls.  
Practical Implications: For struggling companies or for those that want to return to a 
conservative financial policy, they can influence the CEO to make this decision by deferring his 
compensation to retirement. 
Originality: This paper considers debt policy through the lens of a key decision-maker, the 
CEO, and utilizes compensation as an incentive to determine what choices are made concerning 
debt.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper extends the literature by analyzing the various components of a firm’s total debt and 
the new data on CEO’s compensation structure in the United States from 2006 to 2011. 
Specifically, using Capital IQ, this paper breaks down the specific components of short-term and 
long-term debt to determine what types of debt instruments are preferred among CEOs with greater 
incentives to cater to debt holders. Doing so provides greater insight into how CEO incentives 
affect important financial policy decisions, such as specialization, maturity, and yields. New 
empirical research demonstrates imprinting theory (the founder-CEO sets initial policies) is 
especially true for debt policies but changes with new CEOs (Hanssens et al. (2016)); thus, we 
should look to the CEO and his or her incentives and the implications of this on financial policies. 
These new data provide opportunities to address several different empirical questions related to 
compensation incentives. Does inside debt lead to firm debt diversification or firm debt 
specialization? In the presence of inside debt, is short-term debt or long-term debt used more? How 
does inside debt relate to debt holder concerns over yield and maturity? Answering these questions 
is essential to fully understanding the financial policy implications of incentivizing a CEO with 
more inside debt.  
First, inside debt is analyzed as another supply-side factor of debt specialization since firms have 
to compensate staff, especially the CEO, for their use of human capital. Using the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of type usage, firms who pay the CEO with more inside debt tend to specialize 
the firm’s capital structure more often than other firms do. This is especially true for firms with 
90% or more of their debt structure based on a specific class of debt. However, when the interaction 
between inside debt and firm size (a proxy for information asymmetry) is considered, larger firms 
with larger amounts of CEO inside debt diversify their debt holdings.  
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Second, we examine the relationships between inside debt and the various components of total 
debt. Firms with high CEO inside debt are more likely to use commercial paper, senior bonds, and 
commercial loans; have a higher percentage of debt from drawn credit lines, and have a lower 
percentage of term loans; however, larger firms with high CEO inside debt are less likely to use 
commercial paper and senior bonds, have a lower percentage of debt from drawn credit lines and 
commercial loans, and have a higher percentage of debt from term loans.  
Finally, specific components of debt important to debt holders, namely, interest rates and maturity, 
are considered. Since higher inside debt compensation is associated with lower levels of CEO risk-
seeking behavior (Cassell et al., 2012), CEO’s with higher debt compensation might be expected 
to make bonds less risky and thus warranting a lower rate. However, after controlling for factors 
related to bankruptcy, such as profitability and cash flow volatility, we find firms with higher 
inside debt tend to reward debt holders, on average, with higher interest rates and longer issue 
maturities. Higher inside debt, especially above the firm’s debt-to-equity ratio, incentivizes the 
CEO to cater more to the needs and desires of debt holders through higher interest payments, just 
as shareholders prefer higher dividends. In addition, longer maturities are preferred for investors 
concerned about retirement. Similarly, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find CEOs with higher 
inside debt are also concerned with longer time horizons. However, the effect is the opposite for 
larger firms with large CEO inside debt holdings. One explanation for this can be asymmetry. In 
smaller firms, the issuance of long-term securities is more of a signal of sustainability, and this 
signal is more believable the more inside debt the CEO has, whereas in larger firms the long-term 
sustainability of the firm is less of a concern; thus, there is no need to signal and thus the CEO 
makes conservative safe decisions. 
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This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we provide another variable to 
consider with supply-side effect analysis of debt specialization with inside debt. Second, we 
provide a benchmark for future analysis of specific debt instruments left unexplored, including 
total trust-preferred stock, a component of “other” debt. Third, we demonstrate structures of inside 
debt and firm debt are interrelated. Finally, the evidence here provides regulatory authorities with 
further evidence on how CEO inside debt affects financial decision-making. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the characteristics of debt, 
both for the firm and CEO, in the context of the United States. Section 3 provides a theoretical 
framework, leading to an empirical literature review and hypotheses development in Section 4. 
Section 5 describes the research design implemented to provide findings, which are discussed in 
detail in Section 6. Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
2. CEO inside debt, firm debt and executive compensation 
Firm capital structure and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation structure have been of 
interest to academicians and regulators for years. Until recently, capital structure has been 
analyzed in the context of total debt and total equity. However, the Capital IQ database, starting 
in 2001, provides details of debt capital structure, such as types and term structures of debt 
instruments. New studies by Rauh (2006) and Colla et al. (2013) introduce the use of the new 
and comprehensive Capital IQ database to breakdown the components of total debt, into 
commercial paper, drawn credit lines, senior and subordinated bonds and notes, term loans, and 
capital leases. Firms who debt specialize have higher bankruptcy costs, are less transparent, and 
lack access to debt markets. However, their work did not include consideration of CEO 
compensation incentives, which could influence decision-making on financial policies. 
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Only recently has the literature on executive compensation expanded from primarily stocks and 
stock options to include the overall compensation structure; specifically, it has started to analyze 
CEO inside debt holdings, defined as pensions and deferred payments. For example, Sundaram 
and Yermack (2007) use IRS filings for pension data. Starting in 2006, Execucomp provides new 
details about executive compensation after the enactment of Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Regulation S-K, which mandated improved compensation disclosures on 
proxy statements Cassell et al. (2012) show how to use this new data to calculate measures of 
CEO inside debt.  
Lastly, we chose the United States for this study not just because all of the data were available to 
test debt specialization and agency theory jointly but the United States corporate debt market is 
the largest and deepest in the world. Also, 80% of businesses in the United States obtain their 
debt financing domestically (Brandon et al., 2017). These environmental statistics combined with 
the new data provide a rich environment for theoretical research development and empirically 
testing our hypotheses. 
3. Theoretical framework 
This greater insight into firm capital structure can also provide additional insight into CEO 
compensation structure since modeling executive compensation similar to the firm’s financing of 
assets with debt and equity has important implications for the alignment of manager incentives 
with stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Agency theory describes principals and agents 
have different ideas, including varying levels of risk tolerance, due to the separation of 
ownership and control. In order to mitigate these issues, firms should match debt and equity 
incentives of the firm and CEO in order to mitigate agency costs (Agrawal and Mandelker, 1987, 
Barnea et al., 1980). They argue agency cost of debt could be eliminated if the CEO’s 
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compensation contract is set so his debt to equity ratio equals the debt to equity ratio of the firm 
so the owner-manager has no incentive to favor either security holder. However, inside debt 
above the optimal level will incentivize management to cater more to debt holder interests at the 
expense of shareholders. This is the classical moral hazard argument and issue of executive 
compensation. CEOs may create credit default swaps on their pension obligations to ensure their 
claims are senior, and the lenders may subordinate in the case of default. This also introduces the 
agency cost of adverse selection. 
Similarly, greater long-term debt in the CEO’s compensation contract should lead to more 
conservative debt choices for the firm. Edmans and Liu (2011) argue long-term debt is more 
expensive over time and thus more short-term debt will be preferred to maintain a lower 
probability of default for the firm. They find as a manager’s debt-to-equity ratio relative to the 
firm’s debt-to-equity ratio decreases, firm risk increases. 
4. Empirical literature review and hypotheses development 
Debt heterogeneity can provide additional understanding of the firm’s capital structure and 
previous literature demonstrates this. For example, Rauh and Sufi (2010) find low-credit-quality 
firms are more likely to use debt with various types of covenants. Rauh and Sufi (2012) find the 
capital structure of other firms producing similar output is related to assets used in the production 
process. Colla et al. (2013) find debt diversification occurs for large rated firms, but small, unrated 
firms tend to specialize. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012) find financially unconstrained firms with 
few growth opportunities prefer senior debt, but constrained firms, irrespective of growth 
opportunities, prefer junior debt; lower-rated firms diversify across debt classes. Since firms with 
high CEO inside debt are larger, older, and unconstrained firms (Sundaram and Yermack, 2007), 
these firms are expected to engage in debt diversification. 
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H1a: There is a negative relationship between CEO inside debt and firm debt specialization. 
Conversely, a different perspective considers the safer financing decisions of a CEO paid with 
inside debt (Cassell et al., 2012). However, they control for just the debt-to-equity ratio without 
exploring the various types of debt. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) find inside debt increases as 
CEOs age, and higher inside debt incentivizes CEOs to manage firms more conservatively. 
Rauh (2006) finds firms with large pension obligations are financially constrained and invest less. 
Thus, prior literature reveals CEO compensation incentives affect firm investment and firm risk.  
Engaging in debt diversification involves many credit holders, which increases agency costs. Thus, 
the CEO would opt to choose fewer agents to prevent increasing the agency cost of debt (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976). Kabir, Li, and Veld-Merkoulova (2013) find evidence suggesting defined 
benefit pension plans reduce borrowing costs, but executive compensation with stocks increases 
borrowing costs.  Moreover, conflicts of interest among many different debt holders can affect 
capital structure depending on the various claimants and their seniority. In addition, the free-rider 
concern (Holmstrom, 1982) also makes having multiple creditors challenging.  
H1b: There is a positive relationship between CEO inside debt and firm debt specialization. 
Cassell et al. (2012) find large CEO inside debt holdings are negatively associated with risky 
investing and financial policies at the balance sheet level. They argue CEOs want to reduce 
bankruptcy risk to preserve firm value.  However, value can be skewed toward debt holders.  Liu 
et al. (2014) find CEO inside debt is positively associated with firm cash holdings. They find this 
relationship deteriorates during credit events, and the overall cash value declines as CEO inside 
debt increases. In sum, these findings reveal CEO inside debt can have significant effects on the 
firm’s balance sheet. High inside debt firms have loans characterized by lower interest rates and 
fewer covenants (Anantharaman et al., 2013). Other debt instruments have this same characteristic, 
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assuming the security and in this case, the compensation, are truly debt-like (Anantharaman and 
Lee, 2014).  
H2a: There is a negative relationship between inside debt and issue interest rates. 
Alternatively, paying the CEO with relatively more debt than equity will incentivize him to cater 
to debt holders at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). 
This catering could increase debt interest payments, lowering net income and payouts to 
shareholders. In addition, higher interest rates mean a lower price on debt for investors due to the 
discounted present value of cash flows and additional riskiness of receiving cash flows from higher 
interest payments. 
H2b: There is a positive relationship between inside debt and issue interest rates. 
Paying the CEO with relatively more debt than equity will incentivize him to cater to debt holders 
at the expense of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Edmans and Liu, 2011). This catering 
would increase debt interest payments, lowering net income and payouts to shareholders. In 
addition, short-term debt is believed to be an important monitoring mechanism for lenders to 
protect against expropriation by stockholders; therefore, it has the potential to mitigate the agency 
costs arising from stockholder-debtholder conflicts from information asymmetry, managerial risk 
incentives, and foregone growth opportunities (Barnea, Haugen, and Senbet 1980, Brockman, 
Martin, and Unlu 2010). As CEO inside debt mitigates stockholder-debtholder conflicts and the 
likelihood of debtholders being expropriated, the need for short-term debt could go down, leading 
to a lengthening of issue maturities. 
H3a: There is a negative relationship between inside debt and issue maturities. 
However, CEOs with higher levels of inside debt are conflicted: CEOs are incentivized to cater 
more towards debt holders who are concerned about credit risk and bankruptcy, but CEOs have 
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compensation contingent on firm performance. From the lender viewpoint, a firm with more debt 
and higher seniority ranking of CEO pay makes the company a more risky prospect, since CEO 
inside debt compensation is relatively smaller in value than an outside debt instrument, but the 
seniority ranking of the inside debt may be an issue for potential lenders (Anantharaman et al., 
2013). Therefore, a contract with more debt may arise from the firm’s standpoint through the 
channel of longer maturities; i.e., the firm pays a longer period to compensate the lender for 
additional risk.  
Hypothesis 3b: There is a positive relationship between inside debt and issue maturities. 
5. Research design 
Debt data comes from Capital IQ. Financial information is from The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat. Executive compensation data comes from ExecuComp. 
Financials and utilities are excluded from the analysis due to major differences in government 
regulation from other companies. After removing observations with no data either for company 
debt compensation or for inside debt information, the constraints yield 3,725 observations for six 
years for 1,019 firms. Data construction details are provided in Appendix C. Full details of variable 
definitions are provided in the Appendix A.  
This paper follows Cassell et al. (2012) and defines four measures of CEO inside debt. The first is 
CEO relative debt-to-equity [CEO RDE], which is the natural log of the CEO’s inside debt to the 
firm’s debt, where the CEO has debt in the form of pension benefits and deferred compensation 
and equity in the form of stock and stock options. Let us define inside debt holdings as IDH, equity 
holdings as EH, firm debt as FD, and firm equity as FE. This is equal to [(CEO IDH / CEO EH)/(FD 
/ FE)], where CEO IDH is the aggregated present value of pension benefits and deferred (long-
term) compensation, CEO EH is the value of stock (year-ending market capitalization) and stock 
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options (valued using Black-Scholes (1973)), FD is total current liabilities and long-term debt, and 
FE is the reported stockholders’ equity. This variable measures the ratio of the CEO’s 
compensation structure to the firm’s capital structure. The second measure of CEO inside debt is 
an indicator variable if [CEO RDE > 1], which indicates if the firm has aligned interests more in 
favor of the debt holders rather than the stockholders. 
The other two inside debt variables involve CEO incentives. We calculate the CEO relative 
incentive ratio [CEO RIR] using the same methodology for [CEO RDE] except the option value 
is calculated using Black-Scholes (1973) delta valuations for each type of option (exercised, 
unexercised, exercisable, and unexercised unexercisable). We also calculate FE using employee 
options and the average exercise price. This measure indicates how option incentives affect both 
the CEO and employees. The final inside debt variable uses [CEO RIR] but adjusts for future cash 
compensation, called the CEO relative incentive ratio cash-adjusted [CEO RIRCA]. This may 
affect the CEO’s decision in whether or not to exercise his options. [CEO RIRCA] is calculated 
using the CEO expected decision horizon, which takes differences between the industry medians 
of tenure and age and sums them together. If this is equal or less than zero, the cash compensation 
for the current fiscal year is used. Otherwise, the cash compensation is multiplied by the expected 
decision horizon and added to the deferred compensation and pension values. 
The debt variables from Capital IQ follow Colla et al. (2013). The seven types of debt considered 
are commercial paper (CP), drawn credit lines (DC), term loans (TL), bonds and notes broken into 
categories of senior (SBN) and subordinated (SUB), capital leases (CL), and other debt including 
total trust-preferred stock (OTHER). Note other types of debt, including undrawn credit lines, are 
unavailable or are lumped together in the (OTHER) category. Using the relative percentages of 
each debt type to total debt, we calculate (EXCL90), which is an indicator variable if a firm has 
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more than 90% of debt in one type, and (HHI), which is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of debt 
type usage. Unlike Colla et al. (2013), we do not use the total adjustment variable due to 
incompatibility in comparisons with Capital IQ and Compustat. For example, we took a random 
sample of three companies to determine how to adjust debt to yield total debt. In two of the three 
cases, ten worked, but another case required 100,000. Thus, to avoid over manipulating and 
inputting data, we use totals found in Capital IQ to calculate necessary variables and values from 
Compustat to compute financial and compensation variables. Other variables calculated from 
Capital IQ include interest, defined as the natural log of the weighted average interest rate at 
issuance on all debt issues for each fiscal year, and maturity, defined as the natural log of the 
weighted average length of time to maturity at issuance on all debt issues for each fiscal year. 
This paper follows Colla et al. (2013) and define the following controls for supply-side factors. 
(Profitability) is operating income before depreciation scaled by total assets. (Tangibility) is net 
property, plant, and equipment scaled by total assets. (MB) is the market value of equity (stock 
price at the end of the fiscal year multiplied by common shares outstanding) plus the market value 
of debt (sum of debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, and preferred stock liquidating value less 
deferred taxes and investment tax credit) scaled by total assets. (Size) is the natural log of total 
assets. (Dividend Payer) indicates if a firm has positive common stock dividends. (RD expenses) 
is defined as research and development expenses scaled by total assets. (Unrated) indicates if the 
firm is not rated by Standard & Poor’s (S&P). (CF volatility) is the standard deviation of quarterly 
operating income over the previous 12 quarters scaled by total assets. To prevent the influence of 
outliers, all inside debt variables and (CF volatility) are Winsorized by 1% at both tails. Summary 
statistics are provided in Table 1. 
 12 
 
Comparing the sample to Colla et al. (2013), we find the sample has slightly higher percentages 
of (HHI) and (EXCL90). This may be due to historically low interest rates in the United States 
during the time period studied. As reported in Table 1 Panel A, dividend-paying firms occur almost 
twice as often in our sample (66% vs. 34%). This is due to more firms paying dividends after the 
crisis. Measures of tangibility and market-to-book are slightly lower than their sample due to lower 
stock market valuations after the recession. Percentages of commercial paper, drawn credit lines 
and other debt are higher in the sample, whereas term loans, subordinated bonds and notes, and 
commercial loans are slightly lower than their sample. Comparing the inside debt variables to 
Cassell et al. (2012), whose sample is in the midst of the financial crisis from 2006 to 2008, we 
find the inside debt variables have lower means and medians. High compensation concerns and 
record drops in the stock market during the sample period may explain these lower figures. 
Twenty-eight percent of the sample has inside debt at a level above the theoretical optimum (CEO 
RDE > 1).  
Table 1 Panel B shows differences in firms with high or low CEO inside debt as defined by CEO 
RDE > 1 or CEO RDE < 1, respectively. Firms with high CEO inside debt use more commercial 
paper, senior bonds, credit lines, and other debt. Firms with low CEO inside debt use more term 
loans and subordinated bonds. Firms with high CEO inside debt have lower maturities than low 
CEO inside debt firms. Low CEO inside debt firms are more likely to be unrated than high CEO 
inside debt firms. High CEO inside debt firms are characterized by higher profitability, tangibility, 
market-to-book, and size relative to low CEO inside debt firms. High CEO inside debt firms pay 
a dividend more often than low CEO inside debt firms. Panel C explores differences in medians 
and demonstrates similar results. 
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Table 1 Panel D provides correlations between the variables of interest and the other dependent 
variables and controls. Three of the four variables of interest are significantly positively correlated 
at the 5% level with debt diversification. Since CEO RDE > 1 represents a structural break and an 
extreme level of inside debt, note the signs are the opposite for this inside debt variable of interest 
with the others in terms of relationships with some of the controls and other dependent variables. 
High levels of inside debt will lead to more extreme financing decisions during times of duress 
(Lee and Shen (2016)). The variables of interest are all significantly positively associated with 
each other, as should be expected. Panel E provides Spearman correlations. The data here only 
represent observations containing interest rate information. Similar results hold except for some 
loss of significance with CEO RDE > 1.   
To compare further the results with Colla et al. (2013), we replicate their Table 8 (available in 
Appendix B), in Table 2 here. They regress supply-side factors on the debt specialization 
variables of interest (HHI and EXCL90). Similar to their results, this paper finds size is negative 
and significant. We find market-to-book is only significant in the first three models. R&D 
expenses is positive and significant in this analysis. Differing results may be due to a lack of a 
constant in their models, which this paper includes in all the specifications, and the sample 
periods are different. The sample includes years just before, during, and after the Great 
Recession. 
(1)𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐿90
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 +  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 +
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1
+ 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1
+ 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 +  𝜀 
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For the following results in Section 3, all models include year and industry fixed effects at the 2-
digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) level. Firm-clustered standard errors robust to 
heteroscedasticity are included below all coefficients. All independent variables are lagged to 
reduce endogeneity concerns. Tobit models are double-censored, i.e., there is a lower limit set to 
zero and an upper bound set to one for all proportional variables of interest and HHI. The next 
section details analysis of inside debt and specialization using the measures of Colla et al. 
(2013). Then, we break down the HHI into its seven components for individual analysis of each 
debt type. Finally, we conclude with analysis on the associations between inside debt and debt 
characteristics of interest rates and maturity. 
6. Empirical findings and discussion 
After analyzing the original specification of (Colla et. al, 2013) in Table 2, now we introduce a 
control for CEO inside debt in the regressions in Table 3. Three of the four measures of inside 
debt are positive and statistically significant in their specifications. Six of the models have 
significance at the 1% level. Thus, firms with higher CEO inside debt specialize their debt 
structures. Larger firms tend to diversify debt, which confirms previous findings (Colla et. al, 
2013). Market-to-book is significant only in the Tobit regressions. RD Expenses, Unrated, and 
Book Leverage have statistically significant coefficients consistent with previous literature. 
All models also include an interaction term between the inside debt variable of interest and size, 
a proxy for information asymmetry. In six of the eight models, we find a negative coefficient and 
statistical significance at the 1% level. This suggests larger firms with large CEO inside debt 
holdings diversify their debt instruments, which is consistent with H1a. The negative sign 
suggests firm size diminishes the RDE effect; thus, the CEO inside debt incentive is most 
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effective in smaller firms. Thus, agency costs are reduced through debt diversification in larger 
firms but exacerbated through debt specialization in smaller firms. 
(2)𝐻𝐻𝐼 𝑜𝑟 𝐸𝑋𝐶𝐿90
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+ 𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
Table 4 analyzes commercial paper usage. Interestingly, in Model 1 we find firms who pay their 
CEOs above the optimal ratio of one use a higher percentage of commercial paper. Also in 
Model 2, we find the interaction term between inside debt and firm size is negative, suggesting 
larger firms who pay the CEO well above the optimal ratio use a lower percentage of commercial 
paper. Models 3 and 4 show the opposite. This suggests a conservative debt policy unless the 
CEO is incentivized to cater more to credit holders. CEOs with a high vega-to-delta ratio have a 
negative association with commercial paper usage. Larger firms with a higher market-to-book 
ratio and higher profitability use more commercial paper. Also, dividend payers use more 
commercial paper. Firms with higher cash flow volatility or are unrated use a lower percentage 
of commercial paper.  
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(3)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑃 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 +
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Models 5 through 8 analyze the likelihood of using commercial paper. Larger firms with higher 
inside debt have a higher likelihood of using commercial paper, but the interaction between 
inside debt and size is negative, suggesting information asymmetry mitigates this effect which is 
consistent with H1a. Concerning the other controls, similar coefficients and significance are 
found in the other models. 
(4)𝐶𝑃 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 +
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Table 5 investigates drawn credit lines. Models 1 and 2 show significance at the 1% level for 
firm size, suggesting larger firms use a lower percentage of drawn credit lines. According to 
Models 3 and 4, firms with higher inside debt incentives use a higher percentage of drawn credit 
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lines. Larger firms use less drawn credit, and the interaction between size and inside debt is 
negative. Firms with higher R&D and leverage use a lower percentage of drawn credit. Unrated 
firms use more drawn credit. Models 5 through 8 show little significance with respect to the 
likelihood of drawn credit. Similar results occur only for size and R&D. Thus, larger firms with 
higher inside debt demonstrate conservatism through less drawn credit, which is consistent with 
H1a. 
(5)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐷𝐶 𝑜𝑟 𝐷𝐶
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Table 6 provides regressions for term loans. The first four models demonstrate a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between term loan usage and inside debt. The interaction 
between inside debt and size is positive and significant in all regressions, suggesting asymmetric 
information leads firm to have a higher percentage of term loans, consistent with H1b. Dividend 
non-payers with a lower market-to-book ratio, higher profitability, and higher leverage use more 
term loans. Besides firm size and CEO inside debt, the controls in Models 5 through 8 for the 
likelihood of term loans is similar in size and significance. Thus, larger firms with larger CEO 
inside debt holdings use a higher percentage of term loans, again suggesting a more conservative 
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debt policy as firm size increases. However, CEO inside debt has more of a role in smaller firms 
than in larger firms.  
(6)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑇𝐿 𝑜𝑟 𝑇𝐿
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Table 7 analyzes bond usage. Panel A reports results for senior bonds. Model 1 shows a positive 
significant relationship between the percentage of subordinated bonds and firm size at the 1% 
level. Model 2 shows a negative and significant coefficient for firms who pay CEOs a portion of 
inside debt above the optimal ratio. Larger firms also use a higher proportion of senior bonds. 
The interaction term yields a negative result, suggesting information asymmetry leads to a lower 
usage of senior bonds. Models 3 and 4 demonstrate the opposite with respect to inside debt 
levels. Larger firms who pay dividends, have high R&D and leverage, and are rated use more 
senior bonds. With respect to the likelihood of using senior bonds in Models 5 through 8, three 
of the four inside debt variables are positive and significant, which is consistent with H1b. The 
interaction term for size and inside debt is negative and significant, once again suggesting 
conservatism through a lower usage of senior bonds. The controls are statistically significant 
with the same sign across all models. Thus, a lower likelihood and usage of senior bonds is 
demonstrated for larger firms who pay the CEO with a disproportionate amount of inside debt. 
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(7)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑆𝐵𝑁 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝐵𝑁
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Panel B provides results for subordinated bonds. With respect to inside debt and size, there are 
no statistically significant results. From the controls, we find unrated non-dividend payers with a 
lower market-to-book ratio and higher R&D and leverage have a higher percentage and 
likelihood of subordinated bonds, suggesting a capital structure heavily using debt. 
(8)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑆𝑈𝐵 𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑈𝐵
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Table 8 provides analysis of commercial loans. Models 1 and 2 show no significance among 
CEO RDE, firm size, and their interaction, respectively. CEO RIR and CEO RIRCA are positive 
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and statistically significant in Models 3 and 4, respectively. The interaction term between these 
inside debt variables and size is negative and statistically significant, suggesting asymmetric 
information leads larger firms with high inside debt to use a lower percentage of commercial 
loans. Non-dividend payers with low profitability and low cash flow volatility use more 
commercial loans. Thus, a conservative debt policy emerges through using fewer loans. 
(9)𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝐿 𝑜𝑟 𝐶𝐿
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Two other topics of interest related to debt instruments are interest rates and maturity. We 
discuss these separately, but a paper by Dang and Phan (2016) jointly finds inside debt has a 
positive effect on short-term debt maturity and cost. Note, we take the weighted average cost and 
duration for interest and maturity, respectively, so the calculation and implementation may lead 
to varying results. Table 9 provides results concerning debt interest rates. Due to the lack of 
interest rate data available in Capital IQ, the data for this regression is 80% smaller when 
compared to the previous models. Model 1 has no significance among CEO RDE, firm size, and 
their interaction, respectively. In Model 2, for firms who pay their CEOs with more debt than 
what is theoretically optimal (CEO RDE > 1), we find a significant positive association with 
higher interest rates at a 5% level. A statistically weaker result at the 10% level is demonstrated 
 21 
 
with CEO RIR and CEO RIRCA in Models 3 and 4, respectively. The interaction between inside 
debt and size is negative and significant in three models, suggesting larger firms who incentivize 
CEOs with relatively more inside debt have a lower weighted average cost of debt capital. Thus, 
the agency cost of debt through the channel of interest rates is reduced through higher inside 
debt, which confirms Dang and Phan (2016).  Firms with a high market-to-book ratio, lower 
profitability, and lower cash flow volatility have higher interest rates. We further ensure ordinary 
least squares (OLS) is a satisfactory model by testing variance inflation factors. None of the 
variables in the models had a VIF above 10, the threshold of concern, with the highest values 
ranging from 5.83 to 8.75. 
(10)𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 = 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 +
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
 
Maturity is analyzed in Table 10. Note, leverage and maturity are jointly determined (Johnson, 
2003; Billett et al., 2007). Since the inside debt variables contain a component of leverage in the 
denominator of their calculations, these tests and results should be considered for association, not 
causation. Models 1 and 2 show a significant negative relationship between average debt 
maturity and firm size at the 5% level. We find higher inside debt is positively related to higher 
maturity of debt issues in Models 3 and 4 with CEO RIR and CEO RIRCA, respectively. This 
effect is significant at the 1% level for the level of inside debt incentives after adjusting for cash 
 22 
 
compensation, and it is significant at the 5% level for inside debt incentives only. Thus, firms 
with higher inside debt are more likely to have longer maturity on their debt issues. Thus, we 
conclude CEOs paid with higher amounts of inside debt cater, on average, to debt holders 
through the channels of yield and maturity. However, once one considers size, the effect is 
mitigated. Size is negative and significant at the 5% level in all specifications. Thus, we find 
agency costs are reduced through the channel of maturity in large firms, similar to Dang and 
Phan (2016), and exacerbated in small firms. We test the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for 
multicollinearity issues in the models and find the highest VIFs are 5.9 and 4.35, respectively, 
after excluding industry controls. Some industry controls had high VIFs due to only a few firms 
representing those specific industries. Models 3 and 4 show the interaction between inside debt 
and size is negative and significant, suggesting firms with higher asymmetric information utilize 
it to achieve shorter maturities on the debt portion of their capital structure. Unrated firms with 
lower R&D and lower leverage have longer maturities. We again test for multicollinearity with 
VIF. One can also use the inverse of the VIF, and in these models we found none below the 
threshold concern of 0.1. The lowest was 0.17. 
(11)𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦
= 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 +   𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑉𝑂𝐼 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑉𝑒𝑔𝑎/𝐷𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑡−1
+
𝑀
𝐵 𝑡−1
+ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1
+ 𝐶𝐹 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑅&𝐷 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝑈𝑛𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠
+  𝜀, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉𝑂𝐼 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡: 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐷𝐸
> 1𝑡−1, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑅 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑅𝐼𝑅𝐶𝐴𝑡−1 
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Cassell et al. (2012) and Cen (2011) test for the endogeneity of inside debt using IVs such as 
industry medians of inside debt, tax status, executive personal wealth, and state tax rate. We run 
instrumental variable (IV) regressions for Table 2. In the first stage, we include the industry 
median of inside debt, CEO age, an indicator if the CEO is new, total assets, market-to-book 
ratio, an indicator if the firm has a positive tax carry-forward, and the state tax rate. We then use 
the predicted value of the inside debt variables in the second stage where all controls are used. In 
unreported results, we are unable to reject the null from the Wald test of exogeneity, suggesting 
the previous models are preferred over IV regressions. We also use panel techniques to show the 
results are further robust to model specification. In unreported results, we use Tobit and Probit 
random effects and OLS fixed effects and find similar results to the main findings. 
With respect to size, we also tested to see if any effects changed if a size dummy, indicating if 
the firm were in the top half of size, affected the results. Over all of the models, none of the 
effects changed. The size dummy had the opposite sign for all inside debt variables, and the 
interaction term further mitigated the inside debt effect. We also tested baseline models without 
the interaction term and found similar results.  
Another concern is the calculation of the inside debt ratio. Is the CEO leverage or firm leverage 
driving the results? In unreported results, we test all regressions by including a leverage indicator 
if it is greater than one. Only one model has both CEO RDE > 1 and Leverage > 1 as significant, 
but the magnitude, direction, and significance are the same for both. For a more detailed piece 
concerning the negative association between inside debt and firm leverage, see Brisker and 
Wang (2017).  
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7. Summary and conclusion 
Both CEO compensation structure and firm capital structure are important factors in other firm 
decisions. Companies who pay CEOs later specialize their debt holdings. They hold relatively 
higher percentages of drawn credit lines and commercial loans relative to total debt. They have 
lower percentages of term loans and senior bonds. If CEO RDE > 1, they hold higher percentages 
in commercial paper and senior bonds. Firms with CEO RDE > 1 are more likely to hold senior 
bonds. As inside debt increases, firms are more likely to hold commercial paper and commercial 
loans, but less likely to hold term loans and senior bonds. As inside debt increases, interest rates 
increase, and maturities become longer. As firm size increases, the effects of inside debt are 
counteracted. Larger firms are more likely to diversify their debt holdings. They are more likely 
to use commercial paper and loans, senior bonds, and term loans. They have higher percentages of 
commercial paper, but lower percentages of drawn credit lines and term loans. Overall, larger firms 
have debt with shorter maturities. As firm size increases and inside debt increases, these firms 
diversify their debt holdings. They have higher percentages of commercial paper, term loans, and 
senior bonds, but lower percentages of drawn credit lines and commercial loans. Larger firms with 
high inside debt are less likely to hold commercial paper and senior bonds. If CEO RDE > 1, they 
hold a lower percentage of commercial paper and senior bonds. Thus, inside debt in large firms 
reduce agency costs by reducing risk; large inside debt in smaller firms can exacerbate problems. 
We find size is still an important determinant in the firm’s current and future financial health. The 
larger the firm, the more likely it will be to survive, especially given the current environment of 
“too big to fail” in certain countries, like the United States. For small to mid-sized companies, 
inside debt plays a role in lowering risky decisions CEOs make, including financing decisions. 
With respect to both compensation and financing policy, companies should look to diversify both, 
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if possible. However, the firm should balance compensation with the target debt-to-equity ratio of 
the firm; otherwise, the CEO will be tempted to align his interests more so with whomever he has 
more compensation incentives. More inside debt will incentivize her to be more lenient with 
bondholders interests, who are interested in timely interest payments and/or longer guaranteed 
maturities; more stocks and options will incentivize her to be more lenient with shareholders, who 
are interested in higher dividends. Aligning compensation and financing policy will reduce agency 
conflict between management and credit holders and management and shareholders. 
We acknowledge the study has three major limitations. First, inside debt was not available from 
2001 to 2005. Another potential study could look at other forms of compensation, such as long-
term incentive plans, to see how compensation affected financial policy in the years before the 
major compensation disclosure requirement occurred. See Beavers (2017) for sample variable 
construction and consideration. Second, this study only focuses on the United States. Recent 
research has shown debt specialization occurs in Pakistan (Khan et al. (2016)) and financial reform 
increases debt specialization in India (Jadiyappa et al. (2016)), but more work can be done in 
linking this to executive compensation. Other regulatory environments may provide various results 
due to different incentive structures and rules regarding debt issuances. This is also another 
potential avenue for future research. Last, this study occurred during a unique period when the 
interest rate environment was low. What would occur if the interest rate environment were high in 
nature? Other studies could research this question from a past perspective or in economies where 
interest rates are in the double digits. Another interesting perspective would be to consider 
economies or periods when inflation is high to see if CEOs with high inside debt make similar 
decisions aligned with bondholder interests or if they modify their behavior.   
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage 
EXCL90 Colla et al. (2013) indicator if a firm has more than 90% 
of debt in one type 
CP Commercial paper 
DC Drawn credit line 
TL Term loans 
SBN Senior bonds and notes 
SUB Subordinated bonds and notes 
CL Capital leases 
OTHER Other debt and total trust-preferred stock 
PERCP Percentage of commercial paper used by the firm 
PERDC Percentage of drawn credit line used by the firm 
PERTL Percentage of term loans used by the firm 
PERSBN Percentage of senior bonds and notes used by the firm 
PERSUB Percentage of subordinated bonds and notes used by the 
firm 
PERCL Percentage of capital leases used by the firm 
PEROTHER Percentage of other debt and total trust-preferred stock 
used by the firm 
INTEREST Natural log of the weighted average interest rate on all 
debt issues 
MATURITY Natural log of the weighted average length of time to 
maturity on all debt issues 
CEO RDE Natural log of the CEO’s inside debt to the firm’s debt 
established by Cassell et al. (2012), where the CEO has 
debt in the form of pension benefits and deferred 
compensation and equity in the form of stock and stock 
options (valued by Black-Scholes (1973) and the firm has 
current liabilities and long-term debt and equity valued as 
the total number of common shares outstanding multiplied 
by the current market price at the end of the fiscal-year 
CEO RDE > 1 Indicator if CEO RDE is greater than 1, suggesting the 
CEO’s compensation structure is geared more toward debt 
relative to the overall capital structure of the firm 
CEO RIR 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡 + 𝑑𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟_𝑏𝑎𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑜𝑡
𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑠 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑐𝑓 + ∑ 𝑑𝑒𝑙𝑡𝑎𝑖 ∗  𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒𝑖
3
1
𝑑𝑙𝑡𝑡 + 𝑑𝑙𝑐
𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑦 ∗ 𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑏𝑦
 
Natural log of the CEO relative incentive ratio 
established by Wei and Yermack (2011), where the CEO 
has debt in the form of pension benefits and deferred 
compensation and equity in the form of stock and stock 
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options (valued according to option delta by 
exercisability tranches using Black-Scholes (1973)) and 
the firm has current and long-term debt and equity 
options (valued by total employee options, the average 
outstanding exercise price, and assumed expiration of 4 
years). I = 1 to 3 for each type of option (exercised, 
unexercised exercisable, and unexercised unexercisable), 
optosey is the total number of employee options, and 
optprcby is the average exercise price. 
CEO RIRCA CEO RIR adjusted to include the present value of 
expected future cash compensation, which is computed 
by estimating the CEO expected decision horizon 
(Industry median tenure – CEO tenure + industry median 
age – CEO age) x the current level of cash compensation, 
with pensions and deferred compensation as inside debt 
Profitability Operating income before depreciation / total assets 
Tangibility Net property, plant, and equipment / total assets 
M/B (Stock price x Common shares used to calculate earnings 
per share + debt in current liabilities + long-term debt + 
preferred stock liquidating value – deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit) / total assets 
Size Natural log of total assets 
Dividend Payer Indicator if common stock dividends are positive 
RD Expenses Research and development expenses / total assets 
Unrated Indicator if the firm is not rated by S&P 
CF Volatility Standard deviation of quarterly operating income over 
previous 12 quarters / total assets 
Book Leverage Assets less equity scaled by assets 
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Appendix B: Colla et al. (2013) Table 8 
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Appendix C: Sample Construction 
S&P 1500 Firms 1,500 observations 
2006-2011 6 Years 
Total Possible Observations 9,000 observations (1,500x6) 
Observations with no data for compensation or debt 5,775 observations 
Total Usable Observations 3,725 observations 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent Variables      
HHI 3725 0.562 0.267 0 1 
EXCL90 3725 0.248 0.432 0 1 
CP 3725 0.186 0.389 0 1 
DC 3725 0.803 0.398 0 1 
TL 3725 0.470 0.499 0 1 
SBN 3725 0.748 0.434 0 1 
SUB 3725 0.186 0.389 0 1 
CL 3725 0.410 0.492 0 1 
OTHER 3725 0.530 0.499 0 1 
PERCP 3718 0.025 0.078 0 1 
PERDC 3718 0.323 0.334 0 1 
PERTL 3718 0.118 0.222 0 1 
PERSBN 3718 0.388 0.340 0 1 
PERSUB 3718 0.047 0.153 0 1 
PERCL 3718 0.023 0.115 0 1 
PEROTHER 3718 0.077 0.171 0 1 
INTEREST 864 -0.670 1.157 -7.952 2.163 
MATURITY 3573 6.016 1.147 -3.795 6.908 
Variables of Interest      
CEO RDE 3725 -1.257 3.259 -30.216 9.099 
CEO RDE > 1 3725 0.281 0.450 0 1 
CEO RIR 3725 -2.726 3.573 -18.402 12.182 
CEO RIRCA 3725 -1.908 3.359 -18.299 14.493 
Independent Variables      
PROFITABILITY 3723 0.132 0.095 -0.498 0.949 
TANGIBILITY 3694 0.255 0.233 0 0.951 
MB 3725 1.307 1.024 0.043 14.273 
SIZE 3725 8.168 1.645 2.963 14.633 
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DIVIDEND PAYER 3725 0.659 0.474 0 1 
RD EXPENSES 3725 0.018 0.042 0 0.684 
UNRATED 3725 0.394 0.489 0 1 
CF VOLATILITY 3725 0.017 0.055 0 2.093 
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Panel B: Sample Means of Firms Split by High and Low CEO Inside Debt 
Variable CEO RDE < 1 CEO RDE > 1 Difference T-Stat P-value 
Number of Observations 2670 1048    
HHI 0.561 0.566 -0.005 -0.555 0.579 
EXCL90 0.251 0.238 0.014 0.878 0.380 
CP 0.153 0.270 -0.117 -8.349 0.000 
DC 0.809 0.789 0.020 1.354 0.176 
TL 0.490 0.420 0.070 3.870 0.000 
SBN 0.723 0.814 -0.091 -5.787 0.000 
SUB 0.212 0.119 0.093 6.588 0.000 
CL 0.395 0.448 -0.053 -2.942 0.003 
OTHER 0.513 0.573 -0.061 -3.335 0.001 
PERCP 0.019 0.041 -0.021 -7.541 0.000 
PERDC 0.326 0.315 0.011 0.933 0.351 
PERTL 0.134 0.077 0.057 7.103 0.000 
PERSBN 0.363 0.450 -0.087 -7.072 0.000 
PERSUB 0.054 0.029 0.025 4.532 0.000 
PERCL 0.024 0.020 0.003 0.791 0.429 
PEROTHER 0.080 0.068 0.011 1.849 0.065 
INTEREST -0.703 -0.604 -0.099 -0.867 0.386 
MATURITY 6.081 5.85 0.231 5.439 0.000 
PROFITABILITY 0.129 0.142 -0.013 -3.844 0.000 
TANGIBILITY 0.250 0.268 -0.018 -2.076 0.000 
MB 1.288 1.355 -0.066 -1.783 0.075 
SIZE 8.111 8.311 -0.200 -3.337 0.001 
DIVIDEND PAYER 0.606 0.794 -0.188 -11.035 0.000 
RD EXPENSES 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.255 0.799 
UNRATED 0.407 0.359 0.048 2.721 0.002 
CF VOLATILITY 0.018 0.015 0.003 1.552 0.121 
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Panel C: Sample Medians of Firms Split by High and Low CEO Inside Debt 
Variable CEO RDE < 1 CEO RDE > 1 Difference Z-Stat P-value 
Number of Observations 2670 1048    
HHI 0.482 0.506 -0.024 -0.709 0.478 
EXCL90 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.878 0.380 
CP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -8.273 0.000 
DC 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.354 0.176 
TL 0.000 0.000 0.000 3.862 0.000 
SBN 1.000 1.000 0.000 -5.762 0.000 
SUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.551 0.000 
CL 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.939 0.003 
OTHER 1.000 1.000 0.000 -3.331 0.001 
PERCP 0.000 0.000 0.000 -8.466 0.000 
PERDC 0.211 0.200 -0.011 1.186 0.236 
PERTL 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.138 0.000 
PERSBN 0.323 0.493 -0.170 -7.229 0.000 
PERSUB 0.000 0.000 0.000 6.609 0.000 
PERCL 0.000 0.000 0.000 -2.841 0.005 
PEROTHER 0.000 0.001 -0.001 -2.108 0.035 
INTEREST -0.350 -0.396 -0.046 -0.319 0.750 
MATURITY 6.354 6.179 0.175 5.551 0.000 
PROFITABILITY 0.123 0.138 -0.015 -4.341 0.000 
TANGIBILITY 0.171 0.196 -0.025 -4.266 0.000 
MB 1.002 1.109 -0.107 -3.527 0.000 
SIZE 7.963 8.176 -0.213 -3.704 0.000 
DIVIDEND PAYER 1.000 1.000 0.000 -10.861 0.000 
RD EXPENSES 0.000 0.003 -0.003 -7.782 0.000 
UNRATED 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.718 0.007 
CF VOLATILITY 0.008 0.008 0.000 2.328 0.020 
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Panel D: Pearson Correlations 
 CEO RDE CEO RDE > 1 CEO RIR CEO RIRCA 
HHI 0.1660* 0.0091 0.2876* 0.2852* 
EXCL90 0.1623* -0.0144 0.2669* 0.2608* 
CP -0.0102 0.1356* -0.2743* -0.3174* 
PERCP 0.0297 0.1228* -0.1228* -0.1516* 
DC -0.0770* -0.0222 -0.0088 0.0047 
PERDC 0.0826* -0.0153 0.3372* 0.3510* 
TL -0.0713* -0.0633* -0.1724* -0.1620* 
PERTL -0.0423* -0.1157* -0.0706* -0.0460* 
SBN -0.1173* 0.0944* -0.2490* -0.2617* 
PERSBN -0.0554* 0.1152* -0.2139* -0.2364* 
SUB -0.0978* -0.1074* -0.1823* -0.1851* 
PERSUB -0.017 -0.0741* 0.0403* 0.0454* 
CL -0.0294 0.0482* -0.0446* -0.0321* 
PERCL 0.0432* -0.013 0.1006* 0.0982* 
MATURITY 0.0003 -0.0906* 0.1242* 0.1372* 
INTEREST 0.0278 0.0295 -0.0817* -0.1019* 
CEO RDE 1 0.4959* 0.4372* 0.3499* 
CEO RDE > 1 0.4959* 1 0.1560* 0.0993* 
CEO RIR 0.4372* 0.1560* 1 0.9464* 
CEO RIRCA 0.3499* 0.0993* 0.9464* 1 
SIZE -0.1404* 0.0546* -0.4780* -0.5153* 
CEO VEGA/DELTA -0.1943* -0.0323* -0.0523* -0.029 
M/B 0.1137* 0.0292 0.2733* 0.2551* 
PROFITABILITY 0.0790* 0.0629* 0.2066* 0.2067* 
DIVIDEND PAYER -0.0439* 0.1780* -0.2106* -0.2373* 
TANGIBILITY -0.0296 0.0341* -0.0597* -0.0684* 
CF VOLATILITY -0.013 -0.0254 0.0794* 0.0766* 
R&D EXPENSES 0.0942* -0.0042 0.1575* 0.1512* 
UNRATED 0.1582* -0.0445* 0.3478* 0.3671* 
LEVERAGE -0.0498* -0.0436* -0.0691* -0.0575* 
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Panel E: Spearman Correlations 
 CEO RDE CEO RDE > 1 CEO RIR CEO RIRCA 
HHI 0.0846* 0.051 0.2105* 0.2483* 
EXCL90 0.0472 -0.0009 0.0938* 0.1158* 
CP 0.1435* 0.1925* -0.3182* -0.3715* 
PERCP 0.1579* 0.2034* -0.2785* -0.3340* 
DC -0.0514 -0.0126 -0.0029 0.0023 
PERDC -0.0136 -0.0275 0.2799* 0.3067* 
TL -0.1571* -0.1654* -0.0444 -0.0445 
PERTL -0.1996* -0.2142* -0.0267 -0.0215 
SBN 0.0493 0.0509 -0.1122* -0.1290* 
PERSBN 0.1521* 0.1563* -0.1121* -0.1350* 
SUB -0.2126* -0.2096* -0.3058* -0.3034* 
PERSUB -0.2110* -0.2175* -0.2840* -0.2804* 
CL -0.0067 0.004 -0.0181 0.0088 
PERCL -0.0046 0.0213 0.0528 0.0776* 
MATURITY -0.1280* -0.0978* 0.1320* 0.1533* 
INTEREST 0.0138 0.005 -0.1323* -0.1629* 
CEO RDE 1 0.8174* 0.2757* 0.1321* 
CEO RDE > 1 0.8174* 1 0.0700* -0.0133 
CEO RIR 0.2757* 0.0700* 1 0.9352* 
CEO RIRCA 0.1321* -0.0133 0.9352* 1 
SIZE 0.0186 0.1066* -0.5094* -0.5636* 
CEO VEGA/DELTA -0.7286* -0.4428* -0.2692* -0.1150* 
M/B 0.0899* 0.049 0.3666* 0.3677* 
PROFITABILITY 0.0944* 0.0669 0.3031* 0.3076* 
DIVIDEND PAYER 0.2166* 0.2867* -0.2377* -0.2983* 
TANGIBILITY 0.1530* 0.1316* 0.0392 -0.0084 
CF VOLATILITY 0.0018 -0.0002 0.3363* 0.3554* 
R&D EXPENSES 0.2737* 0.2451* 0.2041* 0.1984* 
UNRATED -0.0452 -0.1037* 0.3483* 0.3810* 
LEVERAGE -0.1341* -0.1093* -0.0168 -0.0201 
 
This Table provides summary statistics of the data. Data is collected from Capital IQ from 2006 to 2011. Panel A provides statistics for the full sample. Panel B examines mean differences between high 
and low levels of CEO inside debt according to CEO RDE > 1. Panel C explores median differences. Panel D provides Pearson correlations. Panel E provides Spearman correlations. * means 
significance at the 5% level. All variables are defined in Appendix A. 
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Table 2: Supply Side Factors of Debt Specialization 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 HHI HHI HHI HHI EXCL90 EXCL90 EXCL90 EXCL90 
Size -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.321*** -0.324*** -0.206*** -0.183*** 
 [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.042] [0.042] [0.048] [0.049] 
M/B 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.031*** 0.026** 0.186*** 0.192*** 0.08 0.053 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.011] [0.011] [0.059] [0.060] [0.058] [0.054] 
Profitability -0.238** -0.247** -0.099 -0.095 -0.398 -0.448 0.148 0.106 
 [0.116] [0.116] [0.106] [0.100] [0.584] [0.592] [0.580] [0.570] 
Dividend 
Payer -0.03 -0.03 -0.017 -0.022 -0.180* -0.179* -0.122 -0.126 
 [0.019] [0.019] [0.018] [0.017] [0.097] [0.097] [0.099] [0.098] 
Tangibility -0.086 -0.087 -0.06 -0.054 -0.486 -0.489 -0.397 -0.425 
 [0.066] [0.066] [0.062] [0.058] [0.345] [0.345] [0.337] [0.337] 
CF Volatility  -0.206 -0.083 -0.056  -1.226 -0.677 -0.61 
  [0.155] [0.157] [0.156]  [0.873] [0.854] [0.852] 
RD Expenses   1.116*** 0.946**   3.581** 3.034** 
   [0.424] [0.380]   [1.731] [1.490] 
Unrated   0.124*** 0.088***   0.586*** 0.379*** 
   [0.022] [0.022]   [0.114] [0.117] 
Book 
Leverage    -0.307***    -1.610*** 
    [0.043]    [0.299] 
Constant 1.080*** 1.089*** 0.814*** 0.962*** 2.081** 2.129** 0.918 1.567* 
 [0.114] [0.115] [0.109] [0.117] [0.826] [0.830] [0.781] [0.807] 
Observations 2532 2532 2532 2532 2437 2437 2437 2437 
Pseudo R2 0.62 0.62 0.72 0.82 0.2 0.2 0.22 0.25 
 
This Table replicates Table 8 of Colla et al. (2013) with the particular sample. The dependent variables are the Herfindahl-Hirschman index of debt type usage and an indicator if a firm has more than 90% 
of debt in one type. All independent variables are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. 
Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 3: Inside Debt Effect on Debt Specialization 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  HHI HHI HHI HHI EXCL90 EXCL90 EXCL90 EXCL90 
CEO RDE 0.039***    0.202***    
 [0.010]    [0.077]    
CEO RDE > 
1  0.001    -0.244   
  [0.087]    [0.525]   
CEO RIR   0.032***    0.259***  
   [0.009]    [0.060]  
CEO RIRCA    0.033***    0.276*** 
    [0.010]    [0.061] 
Size -0.034*** -0.030*** -0.047*** -0.045*** -0.196*** -0.209*** -0.306*** -0.303*** 
 [0.007] [0.007] [0.009] [0.008] [0.050] [0.054] [0.055] [0.053] 
CEO RDE * 
Size -0.004***    -0.018**    
 [0.001]    [0.008]    
CEO RDE > 
1 * Size  0.003    0.057   
  [0.010]    [0.066]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   -0.004***    -0.032***  
   [0.001]    [0.007]  
CEO RIRCA 
* Size    -0.004***    -0.035*** 
    [0.001]    [0.007] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta 0.014 -0.015 -0.019 -0.024 -0.046 -0.35 -0.507 -0.641 
 [0.019] [0.018] [0.025] [0.026] [0.089] [0.408] [0.654] [0.726] 
M/B 0.024** 0.025** 0.023** 0.024** 0.049 0.051 0.037 0.042 
 [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] [0.054] [0.054] [0.056] [0.056] 
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Profitability -0.103 -0.106 -0.073 -0.073 0.026 0.05 0.297 0.307 
 [0.104] [0.101] [0.100] [0.100] [0.609] [0.583] [0.584] [0.580] 
Dividend 
Payer -0.019 -0.026 -0.018 -0.019 -0.125 -0.15 -0.12 -0.126 
 [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.017] [0.098] [0.100] [0.099] [0.100] 
Tangibility -0.06 -0.048 -0.062 -0.06 -0.425 -0.387 -0.505 -0.503 
 [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.057] [0.338] [0.337] [0.340] [0.340] 
CF Volatility -0.024 -0.051 -0.065 -0.057 -0.381 -0.627 -0.553 -0.499 
 [0.153] [0.159] [0.165] [0.165] [0.906] [0.887] [0.886] [0.900] 
RD Expenses 0.935** 0.957** 0.967** 0.940** 3.062** 3.180** 3.190** 3.006** 
 [0.368] [0.376] [0.376] [0.373] [1.479] [1.491] [1.509] [1.482] 
Unrated 0.082*** 0.088*** 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.358*** 0.368*** 0.321*** 0.309*** 
 [0.021] [0.021] [0.022] [0.022] [0.116] [0.116] [0.118] [0.119] 
Book 
Leverage -0.282*** -0.303*** -0.284*** -0.289*** -1.426*** -1.585*** -1.439*** -1.506*** 
 [0.042] [0.043] [0.044] [0.044] [0.297] [0.298] [0.306] [0.304] 
Constant 1.002*** 0.974*** 1.051*** 1.029*** 1.581* 1.751** 2.198*** 2.121*** 
 [0.120] [0.127] [0.114] [0.112] [0.812] [0.883] [0.806] [0.819] 
Observations 2532 2532 2532 2532 2437 2437 2437 2437 
Pseudo R2 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.84 0.26 0.25 0.26 0.27 
 
This Table provides analysis of debt specialization given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of debt type usage and an indicator if a firm has more than 90% of debt in one type. The other panels contain dependent 
variables of the relative percentage of the debt instrument used or an indicator if the firm uses the debt instrument type in question. All 
controls are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are 
included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and 
*** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4: Inside Debt Effect on Commercial Paper Usage 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  PerCP PerCP PerCP PerCP CP CP CP CP 
CEO RDE 0.019    0.316**    
 [0.020]    [0.148]    
CEO RDE > 
1  0.365***    3.039***   
  [0.141]    [0.840]   
CEO RIR   -0.024*    -0.016  
   [0.012]    [0.104]  
CEO 
RIRCA    -0.038***    -0.114 
    [0.014]    [0.107] 
Size 0.071*** 0.087*** 0.085*** 0.087*** 0.552*** 0.725*** 0.546*** 0.570*** 
 [0.010] [0.011] [0.012] [0.012] [0.071] [0.078] [0.084] [0.083] 
CEO RDE * 
Size -0.002    -0.035**    
 [0.002]    [0.015]    
CEO RDE > 
1 * Size  -0.038**    -0.329***   
  [0.015]    [0.095]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   0.002**    -0.002  
   [0.001]    [0.011]  
CEO 
RIRCA * 
Size    0.004***    0.007 
    [0.001]    [0.012] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta -1.165 -1.408* -1.789** -1.925** -9.246 -6.591 -9.127** -9.538** 
 [0.826] [0.729] [0.816] [0.831] [5.882] [4.266] [4.294] [4.273] 
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M/B 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.288*** 0.304*** 0.299*** 0.302*** 
 [0.015] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.093] [0.098] [0.091] [0.092] 
Profitability 0.396** 0.392** 0.422** 0.442** 2.243** 2.243** 2.338** 2.479** 
 [0.169] [0.169] [0.172] [0.173] [1.095] [1.124] [1.094] [1.111] 
Dividend 
Payer 0.155*** 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.810*** 0.797*** 0.799*** 0.786*** 
 [0.034] [0.033] [0.034] [0.034] [0.185] [0.186] [0.181] [0.183] 
Tangibility -0.016 -0.013 -0.005 0.002 0.313 0.306 0.337 0.373 
 [0.098] [0.093] [0.099] [0.100] [0.620] [0.604] [0.618] [0.623] 
CF 
Volatility -1.774** -1.942** -1.728** -1.691* -9.563* -10.483* -8.637* -8.377* 
 [0.870] [0.924] [0.864] [0.864] [5.360] [5.755] [5.023] [4.982] 
RD 
Expenses -0.785 -0.792 -0.883 -0.88 -3.925 -4.368 -4.324 -4.461 
 [0.537] [0.527] [0.548] [0.542] [3.032] [3.113] [3.005] [3.022] 
Unrated -0.128*** -0.127*** -0.110** -0.105** -0.575** -0.554** -0.513** -0.495* 
 [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.046] [0.252] [0.259] [0.258] [0.259] 
Book 
Leverage 0.034 0.037 0.015 0.008 0.296 0.313 0.11 0.05 
 [0.066] [0.067] [0.065] [0.064] [0.400] [0.398] [0.395] [0.390] 
Constant -1.062*** -1.250*** -1.172*** -1.170*** -6.938*** -8.824*** -6.868*** -7.071*** 
 [0.139] [0.160] [0.144] [0.141] [1.018] [1.194] [1.061] [1.040] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2286 2286 2286 2286 
Pseudo R2 0.64 0.65 0.64 0.64 0.4 0.41 0.4 0.4 
 
This Table provides analysis of commercial paper usage given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are the 
amount of commercial paper used or if commercial paper was used at all. All controls are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Inside Debt Effect on Drawn Credit Line Usage 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  PerDC PerDC PerDC PerDC DC DC DC DC 
CEO RDE 0.017    -0.004    
 [0.014]    [0.098]    
CEO RDE > 1  0.087    0.085   
  [0.131]    [0.536]   
CEO RIR   0.043***    0.004  
   [0.012]    [0.063]  
CEO RIRCA    0.045***    0.018 
    [0.013]    [0.066] 
Size -0.061*** -0.054*** -0.075*** -0.070*** -0.112** -0.086* -0.097* -0.092* 
 [0.009] [0.010] [0.011] [0.011] [0.044] [0.045] [0.050] [0.048] 
CEO RDE * 
Size -0.002    -0.007    
 [0.001]    [0.011]    
CEO RDE > 1 
* Size  -0.013    -0.042   
  [0.015]    [0.063]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   -0.004***    0  
   [0.001]    [0.007]  
CEO RIRCA 
* Size    -0.005***    -0.001 
    [0.001]    [0.007] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.007 0.299 2.574 3.211 3.314 
 [0.017] [0.020] [0.018] [0.017] [0.589] [1.695] [2.002] [2.066] 
M/B 0.005 0.006 0.001 0.003 -0.09 -0.093 -0.100* -0.098 
 [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.016] [0.059] [0.060] [0.060] [0.060] 
Profitability 0.188 0.187 0.198 0.185 0.873 0.762 0.661 0.633 
 45 
 
 [0.148] [0.147] [0.148] [0.147] [0.698] [0.681] [0.673] [0.675] 
Dividend 
Payer 0.012 0.015 0.017 0.017 0.072 0.116 0.072 0.075 
 [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.024] [0.110] [0.111] [0.109] [0.110] 
Tangibility -0.003 -0.001 -0.01 -0.008 0.452 0.427 0.441 0.434 
 [0.083] [0.083] [0.083] [0.082] [0.410] [0.406] [0.408] [0.406] 
CF Volatility -0.147 -0.158 -0.193 -0.19 -1.408 -1.226 -1.182 -1.222 
 [0.202] [0.205] [0.206] [0.208] [0.986] [0.981] [0.982] [0.974] 
RD Expenses -1.423*** -1.432*** -1.381*** -1.417*** -4.933** -4.979** -4.777** -4.762** 
 [0.501] [0.499] [0.506] [0.512] [2.221] [2.249] [2.231] [2.239] 
Unrated 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.135*** 0.134*** -0.008 -0.022 -0.029 -0.037 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.029] [0.028] [0.127] [0.125] [0.127] [0.128] 
Book 
Leverage -0.427*** -0.434*** -0.387*** -0.389*** 0.277 0.371 0.424 0.454 
 [0.051] [0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.289] [0.284] [0.290] [0.291] 
Constant 0.892*** 0.826*** 0.966*** 0.922*** 0.996 0.732 0.846 0.809 
 [0.134] [0.141] [0.156] [0.155] [0.785] [0.816] [0.798] [0.789] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2371 2371 2371 2371 
Pseudo R2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 
 
This Table provides analysis of drawn credit line usage given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are the 
amount of drawn credit lines or if drawn credit lines were used at all. All controls are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 6: Inside Debt Effect on Term Loan Usage 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  PerTL PerTL PerTL PerTL TL TL TL TL 
CEO RDE -0.031*    -0.081    
 [0.017]    [0.064]    
CEO RDE > 1  -0.348***    -0.737   
  [0.132]    [0.518]   
CEO RIR   -0.034***    -0.019  
   [0.012]    [0.060]  
CEO RIRCA    -0.030**    -0.007 
    [0.013]    [0.062] 
Size -0.015 -0.029*** -0.005 -0.01 0.079* 0.049 0.071 0.069 
 [0.010] [0.010] [0.013] [0.013] [0.043] [0.044] [0.052] [0.050] 
CEO RDE * 
Size 0.003*    0.008    
 [0.002]    [0.007]    
CEO RDE > 1 
* Size  0.036**    0.07   
  [0.015]    [0.062]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   0.004***    0.002  
   [0.001]    [0.007]  
CEO RIRCA * 
Size    0.003**    0.001 
    [0.001]    [0.007] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta 0.019 0.032 0.033 0.038 0.283 0.382 0.392 0.413 
 [0.030] [0.025] [0.029] [0.028] [0.204] [0.285] [0.308] [0.336] 
M/B -0.039** -0.040** -0.037** -0.039** -0.126** -0.128** -0.128** -0.130** 
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 [0.017] [0.016] [0.017] [0.017] [0.064] [0.063] [0.064] [0.064] 
Profitability 0.302* 0.314* 0.289* 0.300* 1.177** 1.211** 1.171** 1.169** 
 [0.170] [0.166] [0.169] [0.169] [0.594] [0.589] [0.589] [0.590] 
Dividend 
Payer -0.106*** -0.095*** -0.109*** -0.108*** -0.368*** -0.337*** -0.364*** -0.363*** 
 [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.028] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] [0.103] 
Tangibility -0.086 -0.101 -0.081 -0.084 -0.013 -0.062 -0.024 -0.028 
 [0.104] [0.103] [0.104] [0.103] [0.374] [0.371] [0.371] [0.370] 
CF Volatility -0.048 -0.019 0.026 0.013 -0.596 -0.535 -0.481 -0.51 
 [0.265] [0.263] [0.275] [0.275] [0.955] [0.955] [0.976] [0.974] 
RD Expenses -0.683 -0.684 -0.727* -0.694 -2.943* -2.988* -2.967* -2.940* 
 [0.439] [0.436] [0.441] [0.437] [1.734] [1.734] [1.746] [1.742] 
Unrated 0.024 0.02 0.031 0.029 0.03 0.019 0.024 0.02 
 [0.034] [0.034] [0.035] [0.035] [0.128] [0.128] [0.131] [0.130] 
Book Leverage 0.395*** 0.400*** 0.375*** 0.384*** 1.539*** 1.553*** 1.556*** 1.576*** 
 [0.061] [0.060] [0.063] [0.063] [0.264] [0.262] [0.274] [0.271] 
Constant -0.143 0.014 -0.165 -0.124 -1.698** -1.378* -1.624** -1.615** 
 [0.170] [0.176] [0.189] [0.187] [0.766] [0.780] [0.789] [0.780] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2447 2447 2447 2447 
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19 
 
This Table provides analysis of term loan usage given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are the amount of 
term loans used or if term loans were used at all. All controls are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. Industry fixed 
effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with firm 
clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Inside Debt Effect on Bond Usage 
Panel A: Senior Bonds 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  PerSBN PerSBN PerSBN PerSBN SBN SBN SBN SBN 
CEO RDE -0.001    0.193    
 [0.019]    [0.160]    
CEO RDE > 1  0.273**    1.469**   
  [0.139]    [0.698]   
CEO RIR   -0.034**    0.184*  
   [0.015]    [0.109]  
CEO RIRCA    -0.043***    0.217* 
    [0.017]    [0.122] 
Size 0.057*** 0.064*** 0.064*** 0.063*** 0.467*** 0.533*** 0.425*** 0.431*** 
 [0.012] [0.013] [0.015] [0.014] [0.072] [0.075] [0.080] [0.079] 
CEO RDE * 
Size 0    -0.029    
 [0.002]    [0.022]    
CEO RDE > 1 
* Size  -0.029*    -0.180*   
  [0.015]    [0.094]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   0.003*    -0.029**  
   [0.002]    [0.014]  
CEO RIRCA 
* Size    0.004**    -0.037** 
    [0.002]    [0.016] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta 0.01 0.012 -0.002 0.004 -1.378 -0.156 -1.112 -1.282 
 [0.035] [0.034] [0.034] [0.034] [3.302] [2.429] [2.558] [2.583] 
M/B 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 -0.024 -0.022 -0.036 -0.04 
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 [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.020] [0.066] [0.068] [0.067] [0.067] 
Profitability -0.141 -0.157 -0.133 -0.122 -1.307* -1.474* -1.16 -1.092 
 [0.184] [0.186] [0.186] [0.186] [0.747] [0.764] [0.742] [0.747] 
Dividend 
Payer 0.144*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.140*** 0.730*** 0.722*** 0.738*** 0.733*** 
 [0.030] [0.029] [0.029] [0.029] [0.132] [0.131] [0.131] [0.130] 
Tangibility 0.108 0.118 0.119 0.119 0.626 0.687 0.619 0.617 
 [0.090] [0.090] [0.089] [0.089] [0.443] [0.432] [0.441] [0.439] 
CF Volatility 0.244 0.244 0.302 0.301 1.097 0.928 1.014 1.068 
 [0.252] [0.257] [0.254] [0.256] [1.573] [1.589] [1.520] [1.518] 
RD Expenses 1.312** 1.317** 1.263** 1.297** 2.7 2.718 2.545 2.5 
 [0.547] [0.545] [0.544] [0.551] [1.725] [1.740] [1.693] [1.691] 
Unrated -0.215*** -0.216*** -0.200*** -0.197*** -0.622*** -0.643*** -0.573*** -0.551*** 
 [0.037] [0.037] [0.036] [0.036] [0.151] [0.150] [0.152] [0.152] 
Book 
Leverage 0.185*** 0.195*** 0.137** 0.134** 1.017*** 1.120*** 1.045*** 1.025*** 
 [0.063] [0.062] [0.063] [0.063] [0.350] [0.337] [0.357] [0.348] 
Constant -0.268 -0.366** -0.306* -0.271* -3.658*** -4.212*** -3.418*** -3.448*** 
 [0.171] [0.182] [0.168] [0.160] [0.682] [0.705] [0.723] [0.722] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2295 2295 2295 2295 
Pseudo R2 0.41 0.41 0.41 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.44 
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Panel B: Subordinated Bonds 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 PerSUB PerSUB PerSUB PerSUB SUB SUB SUB SUB 
CEO RDE -0.006       0.009       
 [0.029]    [0.088]    
CEO RDE > 1  -0.316    -0.579   
  [0.284]    [0.699]   
CEO RIR   0.022    0.079  
   [0.026]    [0.083]  
CEO RIRCA    0.022    0.075 
    [0.027]    [0.083] 
Size -0.018 -0.02 -0.038 -0.037 0.011 0.017 -0.066 -0.062 
 [0.021] [0.019] [0.027] [0.026] [0.058] [0.055] [0.071] [0.067] 
CEO RDE * 
Size 0    -0.004    
 [0.003]    [0.009]    
CEO RDE > 1 
* Size  0.023    0.03   
  [0.032]    [0.083]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   -0.003    -0.012  
   [0.003]    [0.009]  
CEO RIRCA 
* Size    -0.003    -0.013 
    [0.003]    [0.009] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta -0.095* -0.055 -0.073 -0.077 -0.322* -0.2 -0.280* -0.291* 
 [0.053] [0.051] [0.048] [0.048] [0.172] [0.135] [0.149] [0.154] 
M/B -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.104*** -0.104*** -0.205** -0.204** -0.210** -0.211** 
 [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.038] [0.085] [0.084] [0.084] [0.084] 
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Profitability -0.214 -0.183 -0.205 -0.2 -0.942 -0.867 -0.897 -0.875 
 [0.276] [0.273] [0.274] [0.274] [0.713] [0.708] [0.707] [0.709] 
Dividend 
Payer -0.273*** -0.253*** -0.263*** -0.266*** -0.624*** -0.572*** -0.594*** -0.607*** 
 [0.054] [0.054] [0.053] [0.054] [0.129] [0.130] [0.127] [0.128] 
Tangibility -0.072 -0.087 -0.072 -0.071 0.003 -0.033 0.007 0.012 
 [0.207] [0.205] [0.209] [0.210] [0.536] [0.535] [0.536] [0.537] 
CF Volatility -0.513 -0.536 -0.486 -0.474 -1.551 -1.628 -1.338 -1.299 
 [0.720] [0.707] [0.693] [0.691] [1.944] [1.911] [1.843] [1.831] 
RD Expenses 1.907** 1.866** 1.913** 1.894** 2.816* 2.697 2.775* 2.7 
 [0.760] [0.754] [0.758] [0.759] [1.667] [1.658] [1.673] [1.684] 
Unrated -0.267*** -0.272*** -0.280*** -0.279*** -0.698*** -0.712*** -0.728*** -0.724*** 
 [0.066] [0.065] [0.068] [0.069] [0.179] [0.178] [0.185] [0.187] 
Book 
Leverage 0.197* 0.196* 0.213* 0.209* 0.732** 0.726** 0.720** 0.704** 
 [0.119] [0.117] [0.121] [0.122] [0.313] [0.311] [0.314] [0.314] 
Constant 0.167 0.207 0.257 0.242 0.011 -0.007 0.413 0.375 
 [0.309] [0.296] [0.309] [0.299] [0.915] [0.902] [0.906] [0.886] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2257 2257 2257 2257 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.22 
 
This Table provides analysis of bond usage given the presence of CEO inside debt. Panel A describes senior bonds, and Panel B 
describes subordinate bonds. The dependent variables are the amount of bonds used or if bonds were used at all. All controls are 
lagged. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included 
in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8: Inside Debt Effect on Commercial Loan Usage 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
 Tobit Tobit Tobit Tobit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
  PerCL PerCL PerCL PerCL CL CL CL CL 
CEO RDE -0.005    -0.043    
 [0.007]    [0.078]    
CEO RDE > 1  -0.037    0.188   
  [0.049]    [0.511]   
CEO RIR   0.014**    0.08  
   [0.007]    [0.067]  
CEO RIRCA    0.021***    0.143** 
    [0.008]    [0.072] 
Size 0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.104** 0.095* 0.075 0.073 
 [0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.006] [0.048] [0.050] [0.057] [0.055] 
CEO RDE * 
Size 0.001    0.004    
 [0.001]    [0.009]    
CEO RDE > 1 
* Size  0.006    0.002   
  [0.006]    [0.061]   
CEO RIR * 
Size   -0.001*    -0.008  
   [0.001]    [0.008]  
CEO RIRCA * 
Size    -0.002**    -0.013 
    [0.001]    [0.008] 
CEO 
Vega/Delta -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 -1.059** -0.911*** -0.940*** -0.927*** 
 [0.023] [0.026] [0.034] [0.032] [0.456] [0.323] [0.353] [0.354] 
M/B 0.01 0.01 0.009 0.009 -0.047 -0.052 -0.059 -0.056 
 [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.012] [0.058] [0.057] [0.058] [0.057] 
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Profitability -0.241** -0.243** -0.233** -0.239** -1.588*** -1.654*** -1.585*** -1.626*** 
 [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.098] [0.567] [0.569] [0.571] [0.572] 
Dividend Payer -0.024* -0.026* -0.023* -0.022* -0.215* -0.242** -0.204* -0.197* 
 [0.014] [0.014] [0.013] [0.013] [0.114] [0.115] [0.114] [0.113] 
Tangibility 0.067* 0.068* 0.062 0.061 0.593 0.623 0.56 0.546 
 [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.400] [0.404] [0.401] [0.400] 
CF Volatility -0.451** -0.442** -0.459*** -0.465*** -3.391** -3.258** -3.442** -3.509** 
 [0.176] [0.179] [0.174] [0.173] [1.468] [1.499] [1.473] [1.468] 
RD Expenses -0.1 -0.093 -0.092 -0.104 -0.675 -0.613 -0.572 -0.639 
 [0.227] [0.227] [0.226] [0.227] [1.615] [1.635] [1.612] [1.629] 
Unrated -0.008 -0.009 -0.013 -0.016 -0.165 -0.176 -0.2 -0.22 
 [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.015] [0.141] [0.141] [0.143] [0.143] 
Book Leverage -0.035 -0.032 -0.017 -0.011 0.4 0.467* 0.542* 0.604** 
 [0.033] [0.033] [0.033] [0.032] [0.280] [0.274] [0.288] [0.286] 
Constant -0.092 -0.063 -0.06 -0.075 -1.705** -1.664* -1.570* -1.651* 
 [0.076] [0.081] [0.088] [0.090] [0.863] [0.877] [0.910] [0.937] 
Observations 2531 2531 2531 2531 2458 2458 2458 2458 
Pseudo R2 0.67 0.68 0.68 0.7 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16 
 
This Table provides analysis of commercial loan usage given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variables are the 
amount of commercial loans used or if commercial loans were used at all. All controls are lagged. See the Appendix A for variable 
definitions. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust 
standard errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 9: CEO Inside Debt and Debt Interest Rates 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
  Interest Interest Interest Interest 
CEO RDE 0.178    
 [0.141]    
CEO RDE > 1  2.651**   
  [1.122]   
CEO RIR   0.286*  
   [0.160]  
CEO RIRCA    0.340* 
    [0.194] 
Size 0.029 0.119 -0.072 -0.069 
 [0.082] [0.082] [0.116] [0.111] 
CEO RDE * Size -0.014    
 [0.012]    
CEO RDE > 1 * Size  -0.249**   
  [0.124]   
CEO RIR * Size   -0.025*  
   [0.014]  
CEO RIRCA * Size    -0.031* 
    [0.017] 
CEO Vega/Delta 0.166 0.19 0.118 0.145 
 [0.223] [0.230] [0.230] [0.227] 
M/B 32.217** 18.647** 22.209** 21.624** 
 [14.479] [9.045] [9.290] [9.404] 
Profitability -3.747** -3.837** -3.782** -4.052** 
 [1.828] [1.861] [1.880] [1.893] 
Dividend Payer 0.043 -0.038 0.141 0.168 
 [0.328] [0.325] [0.322] [0.337] 
Tangibility 0.921 1.021 0.849 0.913 
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 [0.681] [0.695] [0.689] [0.693] 
CF Volatility -5.222** -5.440** -6.410** -6.362** 
 [2.183] [2.100] [2.478] [2.481] 
RD Expenses -5.044 -5.426 -4.272 -4.263 
 [4.898] [4.754] [4.865] [4.900] 
Unrated -0.333 -0.267 -0.451 -0.432 
 [0.274] [0.277] [0.288] [0.286] 
Book Leverage 0.564 0.648 1.003* 1.086* 
 [0.549] [0.533] [0.581] [0.625] 
Constant -0.005 -0.681 0.589 0.507 
 [0.777] [0.797] [0.941] [0.903] 
Observations 590 590 590 590 
R2 0.32 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
 
This Table provides OLS regressions of interest rates on debt given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variable is the 
natural log of the weighted average interest rate on all debt issues. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. All controls are lagged. 
Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors 
with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
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Table 10: CEO Inside Debt and Debt Maturity 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 OLS OLS OLS OLS 
 Maturity Maturity Maturity Maturity 
CEO RDE -0.021       
 [0.042]    
CEO RDE > 1  -0.539   
  [0.396]   
CEO RIR   0.079**  
   [0.034]  
CEO RIRCA    0.105*** 
    [0.037] 
Size -0.072** -0.088** -0.099** -0.093** 
 [0.034] [0.035] [0.042] [0.039] 
CEO RDE * Size 0.002    
 [0.005]    
CEO RDE > 1 * Size  0.053   
  [0.044]   
CEO RIR * Size   -0.007**  
   [0.004]  
CEO RIRCA * Size    -0.010** 
    [0.004] 
CEO Vega/Delta 0.04 0.037 0.031 0.036 
 [0.050] [0.049] [0.050] [0.049] 
M/B -0.005 0.018 0.042 0.032 
 [0.062] [0.065] [0.063] [0.063] 
Profitability 0.742 0.765 0.74 0.692 
 [0.531] [0.530] [0.532] [0.530] 
Dividend Payer -0.004 0.015 0.007 0.012 
 [0.076] [0.078] [0.076] [0.076] 
Tangibility 0.218 0.193 0.19 0.187 
 [0.223] [0.219] [0.221] [0.220] 
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CF Volatility 0.158 0.185 0.071 0.056 
 [0.476] [0.481] [0.484] [0.481] 
RD Expenses -3.588** -3.602** -3.533** -3.598** 
 [1.533] [1.534] [1.559] [1.559] 
Unrated 0.365*** 0.360*** 0.329*** 0.319*** 
 [0.092] [0.092] [0.096] [0.096] 
Book Leverage -0.394** -0.394*** -0.275* -0.258 
 [0.153] [0.150] [0.165] [0.162] 
Constant 5.546*** 5.672*** 5.787*** 5.749*** 
 [0.271] [0.263] [0.309] [0.293] 
Observations 2451 2451 2451 2451 
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.2 
This Table provides OLS regressions of debt maturity given the presence of CEO inside debt. The dependent variable is the natural log 
of the weighted average length of time to maturity on all debt issues. See the Appendix A for variable definitions. All variables are 
lagged. Industry fixed effects at the 2-digit SIC level and year fixed effects are included in all models. Heteroskedastic-robust standard 
errors with firm clustering are in brackets. Significance is depicted by *, **, and *** at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  
 
